Topic: Consequentialism Without Prospects

Lecturer: Andrew Forceheimes

Assistant Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore;

Ph.D., Philosophy, Vanderbilt University;

B.A., Pepperdine University;

Main research areas: Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Political Philosophy.

Time: 2:30-4:30 pm, November 22nd (Wednesday)

Place: Room 114, South Wing of Department of Philosophy, Wuhan University

Abstract: Many have thought that, because of the possibility that no unique world would be actualized by acting in a certain way, objective consequentialism must be formulated in terms of prospects. This shift — from outcomes to prospects — is usually treated as rather innocuous. Contrary to prevailing attitudes, however, the move from outcomes to prospects is far from innocuous. This move loses what is one of the chief virtues objective consequentialism holds over its subjective rivals: namely, that the deontic verdict of S’s X-ing is, in part, a function of what will actually happen if S Xs. So can prospects be avoided? They can. But this requires relativizing deontic verdicts to the world on which the action is performed.